My experience buying a new CTSW

[thorp]

I caught a 630AM flight for Reno and arrived at the CT showroom/hangar about 10AM.

Having bought the brand new plane sight unseen, I was anxious to see her. All the more
so because I had postponed my arrival twice alredy: once due to bad weather and another
time when the dealer said the avionics were not ready.

I put a lot of perparation into this trip: checked the weather forecast carefully, made
sure that my plane was insured on the day of my arrival, carefully reviewed all of the
AOI information on the FD-USA website and prepared my flight plan.

It had been 5 months since I took that first demo flight in a CT at the AOPA convention.

I thought back over the previous year I had spent evaluating litterly hundreds of aircraft
and finally settled on the CTSW. It had the roominess, economy and range like no other,
and it was brand new. Other planes I looked at were either kit-built or very old. The
only thing I didnt like about the CT was the poor visibility out the back and the lack
of storage behind the seats; but, I wanted a plane now and didnt want to wait until the
"perfect" plane came on the market.

I thought about the many airports near me I had visited and selected one that had a hangar
available and good facilities.

I also thought about the many e-mails I had exchanged with the dealer over the last couple
months while working out the details of the avionics I wanted. So far, everything seemed
OK, except for the incident regarding the color of the CT.

I had asked for a particular color scheme and had indicated thus on my order form, but when
the mechanic at the dealer had sent me photos of the plane during the avionics install, I
noticed it was the wrong color!

I was told there was no way to correct the error without a whole year's delay, so reluctantly
I accpeted the existing color scheme, and contacted Bruce's custom color and caught them
just in time to order a different color cover for my plane.

So much preparation had gone into this day I hardly slept the night before with anticipation.

Things got off to a bad start. As soon as I arrived I saw that my plane was still being
worked on by Gary the mechanic. He was having trouble installing the radio antenna he said.

It wasnt until late in the day that I was finally able to start my 3-hour check-out.

We flew about 1 hour doing the usual stalls and turns and pattern practice, and since
the sun was now setting the check-out pilot asked me to fly the plane to a small airport
nearer to my hotel. It was a nice landing, and I felt I was getting the hang of flying
and landing the plane, although it was unlike any landing approach I had ever done before.

I pointed out to the check-out pilot that I was a bit confused by his approach to landing
as it differed from the recommended approach on the FD-USA website.

His approach was to go to idle as soon as downwind mid-field, wait for airspeed to drop
to 60KIAS, put in 30-deg of flaps, and begin a steep descent downwind, turn base close
to the runway, and make a very steep short final approach. At about 3 to 5 feet pull
the stick back into your lap and let it settle.

His approach seemed to work OK, although it was uncomfortable at first, and he said "Doing
it this way you will always be prepared for an emergency landing. Its how I think everyone
should land this plane."

I now had two unpleasant experiences: the plane wasnt ready to complete my checkout
that day and I knew bad weather was forecast for the afternoon of the next day; and,
my check-out pilot didnt want to follow the recommended pattern given on the FD-USA website.

That was not a confidence booster.

After landing, the check-out pilot opened the cargo bay and pulled out a huge box (about 20
lbs of stuff) filled with books and manuals. He handed it to me and said, "Do some reading
tonight and be ready for the rest of your check-out tomorrow. I'll pick you up at 6AM."

That night while reading the entire AOI and portions of the maintenance manual I discovered
to my surprise that the plane weighed 80 lbs. more than it had been advertised to me.

There was also a note in the AOI that said I was not allowed to disclose the actual weight
and balance information because it was proprietary! I had never seen anything like it.

That was another one of those moments when I had to make a compromise. I thought that
flying for less distance than advertised might not be such a bad thing after all.

So, while doing a sample weight and balance to discover how much I could take with me on
a typical trip, I got another surprise.

The check-out pilot, plus me, plus the baggage (his 10Lb bag, my 10Lb bag and the 20Lb
of books) plus the full fuel had placed us well over the maximum gross weight!

I didnt sleep well that night either.

First thing the next morning, I told him about the weight and balance problem. He took out
a pen and paper, did some arithmetic, and said "Hmmm..I'll make sure we have less fuel
this time."

We took off about 7AM and began to practice more engine-out scenarios, and slips. He
said that I was doing well, and now we should practice 40-degree flap landings.

I immediately objected, because I had read the night before in the AOI that no pilot
should attempt 40-degree flap landings in the plane until after having at least 1-year
of experience flying the plane.

He insisted, so I compromised again, and thought over all of the remarks he had made about
how capable he was with the plane, and how he had routinely exceeded the specs in the AOI
without trouble, and so I trusted that he knew what he was doing.

Landing with 40-degrees turned out to take up nearly the entire runway due to coming in a
bit too fast, so we had to taxi back instead of going around.

While taxiing, I told him that I had decided not to take delivery that day because of the
bad weather along my intended route. He countered that I could just take a different
route and there should be no reason I couldnt take the plane home that day.

I pointed out that less than 3 miles away you could see an approaching snow storm, and that
the weather had changed significantly in the last hour, with the windsock now out to full
and swinging erratically.

He reminded me again that this was no worse than other times he had taken off, and insisted
we go up one more time so that I could finish the last half hour of my minimum 3-hour
check out, presumably to do cross-wind landings.

I was not comfortable with his decision, and at that very moment the highway
patrol had just posted huge electronic signs on the adjacent freeway that read:

WARNING TO ALL MOTORISTS. SEVERE WINDS. EXTREME CAUTION ADVISED.

Too bad I had not seen those signs until after we crash landed.

Yes, that's right. It was not any ordinary landing.

We had barely gotten airborne when he announced that we would have to end the lesson
right away. Too bad he hadn't listened to my objections in the first place.

The thing that amazed me was that he didnt change a single thing from what we had done
before: engine to idle, flaps out to 30, steep approach.

Again, I was struggling to make sense out of this approach. He put the airplane in a slip,
because in our haste to get back to land, we were too high on short final. He then handed
the controls to me and said "Now land her."

That was the last thing I was able to hear from him, because at that point our audio went
dead. We surmised later that the steep approach and slip had let a loose wire disconnect
from the intercom.

At about 15-20 feet over the runway we had a sudden downdraft and hit the tail and bounced.

I immediately put in full throttle to attempt a go around, but he took my hand off the
throttle and I let go of the controls. No matter what he did he was unable to land on
the runway and we ended up in the dirt on the side, with a collapse of one of the main
gear legs, the nose digging into the sand and striking the wing tip.

We climbed out immediately, and thankfully neither one of us was hurt.

We noticed that the fin under the tail had come off and I went out to the runway to retrieve
it.

Moments later, we were surrounded by the police and fire department. We called the FAA
and an inspector was sent out.

To make a long story short, the FAA inspector determined that the damage was sufficiently
minor that it did not qualify as an accident and would be recorded as an incident.

I was told that the repairs should be easy to make and that I would have my plane back good
as new in no time.

At this point I was in a state of shock and wondered if I had made the right choice for the
plane.

Over the next several months I waited patiently for a date when I could finally take delivery
of my new plane. I was told that it would take a while because Flight Design was sending
out technicians from Germany to make sure that all the repairs were as good as factory
new.

However, I began to lose confidence that repairs would be properly made because most of
the pilots I know have a bad opinon of composite planes, and the difficulty of detecting
damage.

First, I made certain that the engine was properly inspected at Lockwood, with magna-flux.

Next, I spent a lot of time looking for an independent DAR that was qualified to check out composite repairs.

I eventually located one of the foremost experts in the country, who agreed to check
my plane for free, provided that I allow his students to use this opportunity for
training in composite aircraft damage detection.

I agreed. It was one of the few good things that had happened in this whole experience.

As time marched on, more and more things came to light.

While at an airshow in Camarillo I met a dealer who was selling the CT. When he learned that
I had purchased one from the dealer in northern California, he was furious.

He pointed out that he was an authorized dealear in southern California, and wanted to know
why I had not bought the plane from him.

I explained that I had met the dealer from Nevada at the AOPA convention in Palm Springs
the previous year, and that he had had me send my money to the dealer in Salinas, CA.

I told him I had never even heard of him before, even though he had attended the same AOPA convention!

When I told him about my check-out experience, he pointed out that the approach to landing
I had been taught was an emergency procedure, and that in no way should that be a regular
practice, and that worse yet no adjustment for the wind conditions had been made to the
approach when the crash occured.

He said that he had a lot more experience in type and that he would show me the correct way to handle the plane.

I said that I would be happy to have him do that, and immediately contacted the dealer in
Reno to tell him that I had selected the local CA dealer for additional flight training
once my plane was ready, and asked him why he never mentioned his name before.

All I got back was "Fred is not a certified instructor, so forget about using him."

That did not set well with me because I grew up in Alaska, and have flown in all kinds
of conditions with pilots who would put to shame most CFIs, and some of them didnt even
have pilot certificates.

I was determined to get better quality instruction in the CT, so I found someone who was
highly-regarded in the ultralight community, who was also an ATP with many thousands of
hours of time, a license certificate 6 pages long, and had every instructor rating known
to man!

The plane was finally ready after 7 months of waiting. I went to Reno to take delivery and
go on one business trip with my plane (back then a requirement before you could import a
plane into CA without having to pay a hefty tax -- something that is now changed).

After having the plane ferried back to southern California, I spent some enjoyable time
learning how to better fly it and began making long cross countries out of state, as
I had originally planned.

There is a lot more to this story, as my adventure with the CT continues, but this covers
a truly crazy experience in taking delivery of a new CT.

I hope no one else ever has an experience like this, and can learn something from mine.

[CharlieTango]

great post thorpe,

i applaud your new approach. i notice that you have transitioned from blame the design to blame the instructor, and of course he's a friend of mine. as i mentioned before he's a competant guy wether he's crossing the pacific or instructing in a 747, or flying his arobatic tailwheeled yak, or flying or teaching in his ctsw or his new aircam he's a good pilot and instructor.

your account has you making nothing but sound descisions only to have the instructor make poor ones. and you manage to put the blame for the crash on the instructor with a tail that differs from the FAA report:

NARRATIVE

(-23) THE PILOT ^PRIVACY DATA OMIT^, PILOT-IN-COMMAND, WAS GIVING ^PRIVACY DAT^ A CHECK OUT IN THIS AIRCRAFT. THIS WAS THE LAST APPROACH TO LANDING DUE TO INCREASED WINDS. WHILE ON FINAL APPROACH, THE PIC INDIATED THAT THEY SHOULD CONSIDER A GO-AROUND AT APPROXIMATELY 400 FEET. HOWEVER, THEY CONTINUED ON THE APPROACH. AT APPROXIMATELY 100 FEET THE PIC PLACED HIS HANDS ON THE CONTROLS, BUT FAILED TO INSURE A POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF CONTROLS WITH THE SECOND PILOT. AS A RESULT, BOTH PILOTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTROL INPUT DURING THE TOUCH DOWN AND ROLL OUT. THE AIRCRAFT HIT HARD AND BOUNCED, THEN HIT AGAIN AND STRUCK THE PROPELLER. DURING THIS TIME BOTH PILOTS WERE IN CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER AND THE RESULT WAS THE LEFT MAIN GEAR BROKE OFF, THE NOSE GEAR COLLAPSED, AND THE PROPELLER STRUCK THE GROUND. IN ADDITION, THE LEFT WING TIP STRUCK THE GROUND AND RESULTED IN DAMAGE. THE PIC WAS COUNSELED THAT HIS ROLE BE VERY CLEAR PRIOR TO INITIATING ANY INSTRUCTION; AND WHO WOULD TAKE CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT; AND HOW THE EXCHANGE WOULD BE MADE.

I immediately put in full throttle to attempt a go around, but he took my hand off the throttle and I let go of the controls. No matter what he did he was unable to land on the runway and we ended up in the dirt on the side, with a collapse of one of the main gear legs, the nose digging into the sand and striking the wing tip.

those accounts are in conflict, you couldn't have given up control and allowed the instuctor to finish the landing (after contacting the tail and leaving part of it on the runway) and be fighting for control thru touchdown and rollout?

I was not comfortable with his decision, and at that very moment the highway patrol had just posted huge electronic signs on the adjacent freeway that read:

WARNING TO ALL MOTORISTS. SEVERE WINDS. EXTREME CAUTION ADVISED.

actaully they post messages on those signs, and the signs are put in place during periods when hi winds are forecast. how could you know they posted at the very moment you were taking off? sounds like an embelishment.

At about 15-20 feet over the runway we had a sudden downdraft and hit the tail and bounced.

funny thing about downdrafts (unless its a microburst) is they don't continue to the ground, at some point they change directions.

you made it sound like john couldn't make the landing, think it might have had to do with the fact that you had already hit the tail and bounced off of the gear? the ctsw looses energy really quickly, once you have had a contact like this you are likely in big trouble.

in closing the story you write is compelling and i hope others might learn from your experience.

[Jim Stewart]

Are you sure the Flight Design pilot was named Fred?

[CharlieTango]

jim,

gee i think so,

Pilot Certificates: AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR
Pilot Rating: GLIDER/AIRPLANE SINGLE, MULTI-ENGINE LAND
Pilot Qualification: QUALIFIED
Flight Time Total Hours: 10500
Total in Make/Model: 270
Total in Last 90 days: 45
Total in last 90 days Make/Model:

does that sound like fred? sounds like john to me.

apologize if i got that wrong.

[Jim Stewart]

I thought it was Tom, not John.

I flew with Tom a week after the incident. He told me about it. His description of it varied significantly from Thorp's.

[CharlieTango]

it is tom not john if you are talking about the dunham brothers.

i'm thinking it is john schautenheimer who has been doing checkouts out of carson city, for a few years.

the stats fit him and the flying teaching style fit him as well.

[Jim Stewart]

Ed,

If you have a date for the incident, I can check my logbooks and see if it corresponds with my recollections.

[CharlieTango]

Local Date: 11-APR-07

[Jim Stewart]

My airplane was delivered the following week Sounds like it was Tom.

[Jim Stewart]

Just one more statement on this and I'm going to let it go.

There are three sides to this story, Thorp's, Tom's and the FAA narrative. I heard Tom's side, but it was a private conversation and I'm going to have to assume it was told to me in confidence. Anyone reading Thorp's version should just be aware that there are other sides to the story.

[thorp]

Just one more statement on this and I'm going to let it go.

There are three sides to this story, Thorp's, Tom's and the FAA narrative. I heard Tom's side, but it was a private conversation and I'm going to have to assume it was told to me in confidence. Anyone reading Thorp's version should just be aware that there are other sides to the story.

I would be most interested in the version that you heard. The FAA inspector told me he was suspicious of the version given by the pilot giving the checkout. As I do not harbor any illwill towards the checkout pilot, I have kept his name out of this.

[thorp]

it is tom not john if you are talking about the dunham brothers.

i'm thinking it is john schautenheimer who has been doing checkouts out of carson city, for a few years.

the stats fit him and the flying teaching style fit him as well.

It was not John S. I have met him and have flown with him before. His style of flying the CT is to use power all the way down to landing, which is totally at odds with the check out pilots way of landing, by going to idle downwind and staying that way.

I will not dislcose the name of the pilot unless he wants me to. It is my opinion that he was being rushed to get that plane out the door, and in the words of the FAA inspector "he just screwed up". That could happen to anyone.

[Jim Stewart]

I would be most interested in the version that you heard.

Not going to happen and I gave the reason why.

[CharlieTango]

It was not John S. I have met him and have flown with him before. His style of flying the CT is to use power all the way down to landing, which is totally at odds with the check out pilots way of landing, by going to idle downwind and staying that way.

I will not dislcose the name of the pilot unless he wants me to. It is my opinion that he was being rushed to get that plane out the door, and in the words of the FAA inspector "he just screwed up". That could happen to anyone.

Now Thorp you are still doing it. Your own account has you dropping onto the runway from 15'-20' resulting in both your tail fin departing the aircraft due to contact and a bounce of off your gear. Only after that was he able to get your hand off the throttle (your account) but still had to fight you on the other controls (faa account) and you chalk it up to "he just screwed up"? That's rich.

John S delivered my CT to Mammoth Lakes and checked me out there. His approach was idle abeam the numbers at 80kts and 15 degrees going to 30 degrees a few seconds later. When I needed more energy to maintain 55kts I would lower the nose and John would recommend power instead. We basically did steep glides with power added as needed to maintain approach speed.

I've never flown with Tom but I know at the time of your incident he was the most experienced ctsw checkout pilot in the west.

[Jim Stewart]

Why do you feel that the throttle position would have affected the outcome of the incident? If you had airspeed, throttle doesn't matter. I always touch down with the throttle closed and more times than not, I can fly from abeam the numbers to touchdown without opening it. I believe I was taught correctly, which is to pitch down for airspeed and use the throttle to make the runway if needed.

In one of my training drills, the instructor simulated an engine failure at 5000 feet and 5 miles from the field. I was able to fly the 5 miles, a left 45 approach, base, final and landing without opening the throttle.