Stupid Pilot Tricks (Pilatus)

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BrianL99
Posts: 314
Joined: Mon Jun 16, 2014 7:23 pm

Stupid Pilot Tricks (Pilatus)

Postby BrianL99 » Sat Nov 29, 2014 7:43 am

This was on my local news broadcast this morning. The NTSB report was issued this week.

8 years since the guy flew in IMC. Apparently only a few hours transition time, to move to a Turboprop Pilatus. Wife & 4 children with him.

From the NTSB report:

"The instrument-rated pilot activated the autopilot shortly after takeoff and proceeded in a west-northwesterly direction while climbing to the assigned altitude of flight level (FL) 260. Light-to-moderate icing conditions were forecast for the area; the forecast conditions were well within the airplane's capability, and the pilot of a nearby airplane reported only encountering light rime ice at the top of FL260. About 26 minutes 35 seconds after takeoff, the airplane's central advisory and warning system (CAWS) recorded activation of Pusher Ice Mode at FL247, consistent with pilot's activation of the propeller de-ice and inertial separator; the de-ice boots were not selected. Less than a minute after the activation of Pusher Ice Mode, an air traffic controller cleared the flight to deviate right of course due to adverse weather well ahead of the airplane. The airplane then turned right while on autopilot in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at FL251; about 4 seconds into the turn, with the airplane indicating about 109 knots indicated airspeed and in a right bank of less than 25 degrees, the autopilot disconnected for undetermined reasons. The pilot allowed the bank angle to increase, and about 13 seconds after the autopilot disconnected, and with the airplane descending in a right bank of about 50 degrees, the pilot began a test of the autopilot system, which subsequently passed. Recovered data and subsequent analysis indicate that the pilot allowed the bank angle to increase to a minimum of 75 degrees while descending; the maximum airspeed reached 338 knots. During the right descending turn, while about 15,511 feet and 338 knots (about 175 knots above maximum operating maneuvering speed), the pilot likely applied either abrupt or full aft elevator control input, resulting in overstress fracture of both wings in a positive direction. The separated section of right wing impacted and breached the fuselage, causing one passenger to be ejected from the airplane. Following the in-flight break-up, the airplane descended uncontrolled into an open field. "

"Before purchasing the airplane about 5 weeks earlier, the pilot had not logged any time as pilot-in-command in a turbopropeller-equipped airplane and had not logged any actual instrument flight time in the previous 7 years 4 months. Additionally, his last logged simulated instrument before he purchased the airplane occurred 4 years 7 months earlier. Subsequent to the airplane purchase, he attended ground and simulator-based training that included extra flight sessions in the accident airplane, likely due to his inexperience. The training culminated with the pilot receiving his instrument proficiency check, flight review, and high-altitude endorsements; after the training, he subsequently logged about 14 hours as pilot-in-command of the accident airplane. Although the pilot likely met the minimum qualification standards to act as pilot-in-command by federal aviation regulations, his lack of experience in the make and model airplane was evidenced by the fact that he did not maintain control of the airplane after the autopilot disengaged. The airplane was operating in instrument conditions, but there was only light rime ice reported and no convective activity nearby; the pilot should have been able to control the airplane after the autopilot disengaged in such conditions. Further, his lack of experience was evident in his test of the autopilot system immediately following the airplane's departure from controlled flight rather than rolling the airplane to a wings-level position, regaining altitude; only after establishing coordinated flight should he have attempted to test the autopilot system."

CTLSi
Posts: 783
Joined: Thu Jun 27, 2013 7:38 pm

Re: Stupid Pilot Tricks (Pilatus)

Postby CTLSi » Sat Nov 29, 2014 10:44 am

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Last edited by CTLSi on Sat Nov 29, 2014 10:15 pm, edited 1 time in total.

Vance Breese
Posts: 12
Joined: Mon Nov 24, 2014 7:08 pm
Location: Santa Maria, Ca

Re: Stupid Pilot Tricks (Pilatus)

Postby Vance Breese » Sat Nov 29, 2014 10:50 am

BrianL99 wrote:This was on my local news broadcast this morning. The NTSB report was issued this week.

8 years since the guy flew in IMC. Apparently only a few hours transition time, to move to a Turboprop Pilatus. Wife & 4 children with him.

From the NTSB report:

"The instrument-rated pilot activated the autopilot shortly after takeoff and proceeded in a west-northwesterly direction while climbing to the assigned altitude of flight level (FL) 260. Light-to-moderate icing conditions were forecast for the area; the forecast conditions were well within the airplane's capability, and the pilot of a nearby airplane reported only encountering light rime ice at the top of FL260. About 26 minutes 35 seconds after takeoff, the airplane's central advisory and warning system (CAWS) recorded activation of Pusher Ice Mode at FL247, consistent with pilot's activation of the propeller de-ice and inertial separator; the de-ice boots were not selected. Less than a minute after the activation of Pusher Ice Mode, an air traffic controller cleared the flight to deviate right of course due to adverse weather well ahead of the airplane. The airplane then turned right while on autopilot in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at FL251; about 4 seconds into the turn, with the airplane indicating about 109 knots indicated airspeed and in a right bank of less than 25 degrees, the autopilot disconnected for undetermined reasons. The pilot allowed the bank angle to increase, and about 13 seconds after the autopilot disconnected, and with the airplane descending in a right bank of about 50 degrees, the pilot began a test of the autopilot system, which subsequently passed. Recovered data and subsequent analysis indicate that the pilot allowed the bank angle to increase to a minimum of 75 degrees while descending; the maximum airspeed reached 338 knots. During the right descending turn, while about 15,511 feet and 338 knots (about 175 knots above maximum operating maneuvering speed), the pilot likely applied either abrupt or full aft elevator control input, resulting in overstress fracture of both wings in a positive direction. The separated section of right wing impacted and breached the fuselage, causing one passenger to be ejected from the airplane. Following the in-flight break-up, the airplane descended uncontrolled into an open field. "

"Before purchasing the airplane about 5 weeks earlier, the pilot had not logged any time as pilot-in-command in a turbopropeller-equipped airplane and had not logged any actual instrument flight time in the previous 7 years 4 months. Additionally, his last logged simulated instrument before he purchased the airplane occurred 4 years 7 months earlier. Subsequent to the airplane purchase, he attended ground and simulator-based training that included extra flight sessions in the accident airplane, likely due to his inexperience. The training culminated with the pilot receiving his instrument proficiency check, flight review, and high-altitude endorsements; after the training, he subsequently logged about 14 hours as pilot-in-command of the accident airplane. Although the pilot likely met the minimum qualification standards to act as pilot-in-command by federal aviation regulations, his lack of experience in the make and model airplane was evidenced by the fact that he did not maintain control of the airplane after the autopilot disengaged. The airplane was operating in instrument conditions, but there was only light rime ice reported and no convective activity nearby; the pilot should have been able to control the airplane after the autopilot disengaged in such conditions. Further, his lack of experience was evident in his test of the autopilot system immediately following the airplane's departure from controlled flight rather than rolling the airplane to a wings-level position, regaining altitude; only after establishing coordinated flight should he have attempted to test the autopilot system."

This was an instrument rated pilot flying a capable aircraft on a reasonable flight.
Stupid is not how I would describe him; overconfident maybe.
For me to try to try to make that flight in my gyroplane would be a poor aviation decision.
I have made mistakes too.
I have not always made the best decisions when things start to go badly.
My luck has held and I did not have to pay a big price.
I feel that just because something worked out does not validate my aviation decision making.
Over confidence is my nemesis.
Regards, Vance Breese
Rotorcraft, Gyroplane CFI
KSMX

Wm.Ince
Posts: 602
Joined: Sun Nov 17, 2013 3:27 pm
Location: Clearwater, FL

Re: Stupid Pilot Tricks (Pilatus)

Postby Wm.Ince » Sat Nov 29, 2014 11:50 am

Vance Breese wrote:
BrianL99 wrote:Over confidence is my nemesis.
Complacency is another dangerous disposition. And it can affect all levels of aviators, professional, as well as recreational. It usually has telltale signs before the event happens.
Bill Ince
CTSW
Retired Heavy Equipment Operator


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