Please help me make sense of this light sport fatal accident

[cogito]

Harry Bell kept his sting sport at the same airport, Whiteman (WHP,) as I did. Since my Sting was in the same hangar row we’d chat from time to time and since he was on in years, 89, I’d help with the hangar door, inflating tires, etc.
Last month he was on his BFR with another CFI (Harry was also an instructor) when they both died in what looks like a spin into the ground.

-perfect weather
-autopsy showed no drugs or carbon monoxide.
-aircraft had just come out of annual.

I’ve been out of town all summer and haven’t been able to ask anyone at the airport, but the katherynreport is troubling:

http://kathrynaviationnews.com/?p=65517

Even if they were practicing stalls as indicated by SoCal flight following, and didn’t manage to recover and went into a spin, the Sting had a parachute, why wouldn’t either one of them have pulled it?
The final NTSB report is, of course, not out yet.

I’m a huge proponent of Light Sport and aircraft parachutes, but now I’m considering getting a PPL and maybe a Diamond DA40, which seems to have the safest accident record even though it doesn’t have a chute.

Any thoughts about what happened to Harry?
Thanks,
Craig

[jnmeade]

Let the speculation begin. There is not much info to go on so a number of questions come to play.
What was their altitude when the girls saw them? My pure guess is a couple of teenage girls don't automatically search hard for airplanes, so the plane was likely low enough to be in their field of view and got their attention. The ground is about 700msl, from that I can find.
What were they doing that looked like a loop (assuming the girls knew what a loop was)?
What was the "pop" that was followed by "very quiet"? Did they run out of fuel? They were big enough men that maybe a fuel computation might hvae been in order rather than "fill 'er up". Could they have erred and had fuel exhaustion?
What are the chances of a mechanical problem that would present as a pop followed by quiet.
Descending in a ccw manner, nose down could certianly be a spin.

OK, here's my pure specualtion
Plane was flying low, maybe 1000-1500 AGL (otherwise girls wouldn't have seen them)
Plane pulled up significantly (going into a loop)
Possible mechanical or fuel issue (pop, then quiet)
Plane quickly stalled, perhaps startling pilots - fast push down is called for, but who is in charge, who current is Bell?
Plane entered spin (nose down, CCW)
Who is in charge? Both work on controls, both forget BSR.

Your speculation is every bit as likely as mine.

[Jim Stewart]

The NTSB report will be out in a few months and hopefully will have more information. Anything else is pure speculation.

As to not pulling the chute, it happens all too often. We lost a pilot and his wife here in Northern California a couple of years ago. The pilot stalled and spun in the pattern and witnesses saw him struggling with the plane all the way to the ground even though he had a chute.

I'm sorry for your loss. From what I've read, we lost two good men.

[FastEddieB]

I probably posted this before, but here's a post I made to the Cirrus Owner's site in Sept 2006 which may be relevant, esp. Scenario 2:

Last Saturday was the nice little fly-in into Kennesaw, GA.

Part of the “hook” was a chance to try out the SimTrain Cirrus simulator nearby.

While my basic flying skills weren’t too bad, I sort of blew two emergency scenarios, though the first was at least survivable.

Scenario 1

Right after takeoff, it became apparent the “plane” was no longer climbing. The good news is that I decreased pitch enough to keep flying and managed to land on the remaining runway.

The bad news is that the instructor (Joe Davis) had failed the oil pressure at the beginning of the takeoff roll, and I hadn’t noticed it.

My bad, and no excuses, but...

...I normally take off with the Emax screen up. Because I wasn’t using my personalized checklist, I did not have the Emax screen displayed. I generally monitor the climb of EGTs, the CHTs and the RPM. I don’t know that I generally scan the other gauges, though now I’ll probably start. I still may have seen the red “abnormal” oil pressure display, but since I missed the “Oil” annunciator, I’m not 100% sure of that, either.

Scenario 2

At some point in the flight, at about 4,000’, the plane entered what seemed to be a spin. I pushed the stick forward, determined the direction of rotation and pushed opposite rudder. I think I retarded the throttle as well. I seemed to be making some progress (I thought) when someone in the peanut gallery said “chute?”. Seemed like a plan and I reached up for the handle, but it was blocked by the cover. I spent a second or two fumbling with the tiny pull-tab on the cover, and then hit the ground. Yikes.

Turns out the left wing had departed and the “spin” was unrecoverable.

This was a real eye-opener to me. I had wondered why the NY pilots who spun never pulled the chute and was certain I would have. Now I’m not so sure.

Observations:

1) Once the plane started to “spin” the only term I can think of is “task fixation”. I was 100% wrapped up in recovering from the spin. I’ve done hundreds of spins in the past and managed to recover from each and every one, so why not this one?

Warren Zevon (R.I.P.) sang “You’re a whole ‘nother person when you’re scared”. Even in a simulation this was pretty intense and the amount of fixation was remarkable. Kind of like tunnel vision with blinders to any other task.

2) IMHO, having the CAPS cover in place could have fatal consequences. In this case, I don’t care what the POH says (and that means something coming from me!). If the cover is a required placard, maybe it could be Velcro’d to the ceiling next to the handle (I think Mike has the “Pull Procedure” laminated in the handle’s recess). Turns out in my scenario I also had the pin in place - again, I blame this on not having my own checklist which I’m very used to. Still, it shows poor use of the checklist which was provided.

3) I thought Mike R’s “BAM-touch head-grab handle” exercise was cute but a bit over-the-top. I take it back, and will practice it myself in the future.

Similarly, I was impressed when Jeff Seymore briefed the takeoff by showing, on the backup altimeter, the altitude where he would start considering the ‘chute and no longer commit to a straight ahead landing if the engine failed. Again, a good idea which I may incorporate into my own routine.

Anyway, I learned a lot in a very short time (15 minutes?) and plan on going back, next time on my own dime. I figure if I go every other month and shoot at least 3 approaches and do some holds/intercepts, at least I’ll stay current. And I’m sure they have more of these wicked little scenarios I can screw up!

[spooky981]

It costs something like $10,000 which is not covered by most insurance to pull the chute. Virtually none of the emergency procedure practice I did ever even paid attention to the chute - they didn't want you to pull it. It was an absolute last resort and I'll bet most flight schools teach it the exact same way.

Too bad many people crash before the feel they have sufficiently run out of options and it's time to pull the lever.

[ibgarrett]

I own/fly a StingSport as well, so this particular accident is one I'm watching a bit closer than others (I try to at least pay attention to others as well so I can learn from their mistakes).

I have a 2007 model of the StingSport and the placement of the actuator for the parachute has always puzzled me. It is behind the passengers head. Even when I'm on the ground and arming/disarming the parachute actuator it is a bit of an effort to reach back and remove the pin. I can't for the life of me figure out how I would be able to get my hand/arm back there to pull on the actuator to deploy the parachute if I was in a spin or any other form of orientation where the G-forces would be having their way with me.

I also fly my Sting with no intention of ever having to rely upon the parachute - however I also hope I'm flying high enough to give me some time to do some other basic troubleshooting prior to needing the chute. As I tell my passengers, short of loosing a wing, we won't be using the chute.

As for the two owners who went down in the Sting, their combined time is well over a factor of 20 over my time flying. So I would expect them both to have enough awareness to recover from a spin much less ever enter into one that is placarded "Spins Prohibited". But even with that I'm coming dangerously close to back-seat flying these guys and I can only hope the report is able to draw some clear conclusions.

[FastEddieB]

It costs something like $10,000 which is not covered by most insurance to pull the chute.

Just speaking of the Cirrus BRS, but...

1) I'm pretty sure each and every Cirrus pull has been covered by insurance. In fact, one of the thoughts when pulling the chute is, "Well, the insurance company owns it now!"

It's assumed that once you pull the red handle in the Cirrus, the plane will be totaled. However there are a handful that came down so softly they were in fact repaired and are flying again.

2) In the big picture, surviving should be first and foremost. Many, many pilots have died trying to save props, not pulling, trying to make it to an airport with better services, etc. etc. In an emergency, financial considerations should never, ever compromise safety.

Even if I had to choose between $10,000 out of pocket and the risk of dying, it would be no choice at all.

[zaitcev]

Pin happens too often. There was a guy who died in Remos GX a few months ago, on the flight back from installation of the brand new chute. Investigators found that chute pin was not just in, but locked with a padlock (!!!), and the key for the padlock was found on the deceased pilot's keychain.

[cogito]

Pin happens too often. There was a guy who died in Remos GX a few months ago, on the flight back from installation of the brand new chute. Investigators found that chute pin was not just in, but locked with a padlock (!!!), and the key for the padlock was found on the deceased pilot's keychain.

Ugh.
On my Sting before takeoff checklist were:
–remove parachute pin
-brief passenger on pulling chute

I always assumed pulling the chute was a total write-off of the aircraft. I had an off-field landing in my Sting (engine out) but didn’t pull the chute because I was too low, and I had a good place to land. (concrete river wash, I live in Los Angeles) My plane was undamaged, actually one of my better landings. I never considered cost, however, in getting my passenger and me safely on the ground. But in a city, who knows where one might land when parachuting down. Buildings, power lines, etc.
Where Harry ended up there was a perfectly good dirt road to land on.

[ibgarrett]

Just to be clear - I ALWAYS remove the safety pin from the BRS. The part I'm concerned about is being able to reach the firing mechanism if things were falling apart badly enough that I felt it was my only option (ie: a wing falling off). I am pretty certain that if I wing were to fall off the plane, or if I was a completely uncontrollable spin there'd be so much thrashing around in the plane that I wouldn't be able to get to the lever. Not a happy situation for sure.

[Jim Stewart]

Me too. The pin is on the ignition keyring.

I fly a lot with my wife and anytime there's not a "land straight ahead" option, we brief the takeoff including possible chute use.

[ct4me]

-aircraft had just come out of annual.

Unfortunately, just coming out of an annual probably increases the chances for problems. Sometimes called "Mechanic Induced Failure". Something as simple as leaving a flashlight or a wrench somewhere where it might affect controls. Something loose, or something not connected.

[ussyorktown]

didn’t pull the chute because I was too low

BRS sent me Notice "Pull the damn rip cord at any altitude." So I assume that is even very low 1000 feet like here.

Minimum deployment altitude

Says Popov of BRS:

"1) We have documented (video/eyewitnesses) of (lives) saves occurring where pilots have activated a BRS ultralight system below 200 feet AGL, one even at 100' AGL. Although these were not Cirrus-size chutes, it nonetheless points out the extraordinary capabilities of a rocket-deployed parachute. Keep in mind that your airspeed, parachute size, and the descent angle all affect your opening times and your minimum altitude to achieve FULL deployment."

[ussyorktown]

Note: as a sponsor of the recent KANE CPPP, BRS Aerospace was invited to speak to the group of assembled Cirrus pilots and instructors. Boris Popov, founder and VP of BRS Aerospace and inventor of the ballistic parachute system, spoke during our lunch break and held an extensive Q&A session. He provided me with his remarks in the form of a blog, which I am presenting here on his behalf.

As the founder of BRS, and having received in my hand the first ever check from Alan Klapmeier to initiate the development of the BRS parachute for the Cirrus CAPS system, I have followed with considerable interest the recent dialogue on the COPA web site, and other web sites, whenever the subject of parachute deployment arises.

It's hard to overstate the level of frustration, and concern, we at BRS have had for the last decade with the lack of adequate training and the misunderstood capabilities of ballistically deployed parachute systems. There is absolutely no doubt in our minds that pilots and passengers are dying needlessly due to this untenable situation ... and we at BRS are initiating programs to help mitigate it.

Our primary concern is the apparent unwillingness, or hesitation, to deploy in a broad spectrum of actual emergency scenarios. This subject has been widely and deeply discussed on this COPA website, with Rick Beach's long standing commentary well thought out and elegantly presented. "Pull early, pull often" is a good mantra to follow, for reasons that may surprise you.

After 255 saved lives, 30 years in the ballistic parachute business, and nearly 35,000 systems sold worldwide, we know our product and our markets well. Currently (and during the decades of developing the system) many of the staff at BRS are licensed pilots with experience from hang gliding through sophisticated high-performance aircraft. Some of us even survived structural failures and other life-threatening emergency situations. We've been there, in the air, making a decision most pilots will never have to make. This melding of expertise in flying and designing emergency parachutes gives us a unique and valuable perspective on when and where one makes that decision to trade a likely deadly experience into one still frightening, but survivable one.

Here are some hard supportable data about the capabilities and performance expectations of a BRS ballistic parachute:

Minimum deployment altitude

1) We have documented (video/eyewitnesses) of saves occurring where pilots have activated a BRS ultralight system below 200 feet AGL, one even at 100' AGL. Although these were not Cirrus-size chutes, it nonetheless points out the extraordinary capabilities of a rocket-deployed parachute. Keep in mind that your airspeed, parachute size, and the descent angle all affect your opening times and your minimum altitude to achieve FULL deployment.

Drag/brake chute on the ground

2) The initial extraction process of a parachute deployment creates significant parasitic drag. At the least, this creates a nose-up attitude that could be critical in changing a deadly vertical or near vertical impact into an energy-dissipating glancing bounce, and should occur within a half second after activating the system. Pilots do not seem to appreciate what a great big drag/brake chute they have on board, capable of quickly stopping forward velocity even on the ground.

Pull Early, Pull Often, and Keep Pulling!

3) We suspect at least a few pilots thought they had a malfunctioning activating handle when in fact they simply had not pulled the handle with enough force to activate the system. It needs to be stressed that one not only pulls early, pulls often...but continues to pull/yank until activation occurs. Perhaps we should cease using the word "pull" and use "yank" as it implies a harder, quicker action better describing the necessary activating forces. (BRS is currently developing an electronically activated system that should provide more versatility in locating the activating handle, and in activation effectiveness)

Steering with power under canopy

4) Through the process of performing dozens of in-air deployments in various aircraft, we have found that in many cases the aircraft is somewhat "steerable" under the canopy. Our test pilots were able to steer the parachute in early tests with Pitts and Cessna 150 aircraft, although they have different parachutes and weights from a Cirrus. This applies only to tractor prop configurations. During one Cirrus deployment the pilot thought he was able to "steer" the aircraft under canopy away from a power plant and to a nearby open area. Later I've learned from Rick Beach that might have been the direction of the prevailing winds. If you find yourself in such a situation with a tractor prop driven airplane, use the power of the engine to provide some ability to steer towards a desirable landing area.

When to pull the handle?

I am asked quite often under what situation I would deploy a BRS parachute. There are many and most of us have heard/read the typical ones. Bottom line for me is "I WILL PULL THE HANDLE WHEN I HAVE LOST CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE AT ANY ALTITUDE." When you have lost control of your aircraft, a parachute deployment will not regain control of the aircraft, but likely allow you to regain control of the situation.

When you need it, use it!

Seems most pilots of parachute-equipped aircraft believe there is some empirically based magic altitude where a go/no go exists. Not true. If I have lost control of the aircraft after a particularly bad landing and am veering out of control at 50 feet altitude towards a tree line/fence/building -- use the chute as a very expensive drag chute. Even at the normal landing/approach speeds you will most probably have a fairly quick opening that will decelerate your aircraft to survivable speeds -- if you make the decision in time. My philosophy is that whenever I find myself in a potential deployment situation, I will first continue to try to solve the problem by flying the aircraft with one hand on the stick/yoke, while the other hand will be on the activating handle ready for an immediate pull. Always keep in mind that it typically takes 3-4 seconds to decide to deploy, reach the handle, and pull the handle. A 1500 ft/min descent equates to 75 to100 feet lost just for this process alone. The parachute canopy, suspension lines, and risers total about 88 feet, adding to the distance required for FULL deployment. (With any kind of glide angle, which most commonly occurs, these distances would be worst case). When you need it, use it!

With the above in mind, BRS has embarked on a process to provide updated procedural training and better disseminate accurate capabilities of rocket-deployed parachutes. We will provide one hour of full-motion simulator training, recreating both successful and unsuccessful parachute deployments, for every general aviation repack order we receive. We will do so via publishing hard data on actual saves, and be more proactive on pertinent blog/forums focused on aviation safety.

We have a proven safety device that has saved hundreds of lives, and will save even more through better education and training. We owe that much to ourselves and all those fly with us, as well as upcoming pilots who expect nothing less.

Boris Popov

(ussyorktown, the cynical lawyer, "yeah and using the BRS at the drop of a hat will guarantee we will sell a lot of replacements" (Don't think this in your brain when you're going down.

[saintlfd]

I have 25 hours of training in a chute-equipped LSA. Not ONCE has the CFI mentioned anything about how/when the chute should be used. Not ONCE have we pulled the pin to make it even possible to deploy the chute.

That nonsense stops now!