It's old news and has been cussed and discussed quite a bit.
You're also cherry picking inflammatory data that is interesting but needs to be examined further. There are 40 fatal accidents in the study and 32 are attributable to pilot error (see page 10). Of the 8 non-pilot errors, exactly 2 of these are due to design/production flaws and 6 are design/production "contributing factor". The report further goes that ALL design and ALL production flaws have been reviewed by and appropriate corrective action obtained by the SLSA manufacturer in accordance with the applicable industry consensus standards and FAA regulations requirements. The take-away would be that a pilot or prospective owner should ensure the particular aircraft they are flying/buying has the corrective actions. No different that the non-LSA world.
You also may want to further examine what the FAA/NTSB calls a design issue that contributes to the accident.
One of these issues that was considered a contributing factor in a tragic fatal accident by a TL-Ultralight Sting. The Probable Cause:
The inability of the pilot-in-command (PIC) to recover from an inadvertent spin following a stall demonstration for reasons that could not be determined because aircraft and engine examinations did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded recovery from the spin. Contributing to the severity of the accident were the PIC’s failure to remove the airframe parachute system safety pin before takeoff, the exceedance of the left-seat weight limitation, and the location of the parachute system activation handle behind the PIC’s seat, which prevented easy access during the uncontrolled descent.
The contributing design issue was the location of the parachute handle. Keep in mind the PIC intentionally did not remove the pin (see the NTSB report) and the pin itself was bent to a 90 degree angle. Not so sure the location of the handle was an issue since one of the occupants clearly found the handle and exerted a LOT of force. Perhaps the more germane issue was ignoring the POH and checklist. The spin issue was also exasperated by the deceased reporting his weight at 275lbs with the seat limit at 250lbs. Turns out he weighed 340lbs. In addition to far exceed the seat's design capacity, this pushed the airplane to 70lbs over gross. The ASTM requires spin testing to MTOW -- not 70lbs over.
Look at P18 for the non-pilot error issues and you'll find Wing structure the only one that is alarming. I'm pretty sure this is the Zodiac which has long since been addressed.
The general conclusion was that LSA's have a comparable safety record to GA.